son had been imprisoned in Mauritius, for an order to compel the South African government to enter into a prisoner transfer agreement with Mauritius, which was willing to enter into such an agreement. The High Court 7 declined to make such order holding, inter alia:
That does not avail the applicants as it is based on the narrow view that once Mauritius is prepared to enter into a [Prisoner Transfer Agreement] PTA, the government is somehow compelled to enter into such an agreement without further ado. The ... respondent's submissions that the government has to take into consideration a number of other factors cannot be faulted ... there are 1049 South Africans who are prisoners in Brazil, an as yet undetermined number in other countries and that there are policy considerations to exclude certain types of crimes (for example drug related offences). In other words there are various factors to be considered and for this reason the government has decided not to enter into a PTA with Mauritius. However, the decision has not been cast in stone.
It has left open the possibility that it may do so in the future after considering all the other factors that have a bearing on the matter.
The Court 8 concluded that:
The applicant concedes that she may not have a right to insist that the Government enter into a PTA. I am of the view that the reasons given by the ... respondent, objectively considered, are not only sufficient but also cannot be regarded as irrational. They are rationally connected to the decision not to enter into a PTA with Mauritius at this stage and are justifiable. In addition, if the government were to enter into a PTA with Mauritius it may well be accused of being unfair and treating the same or different classes of South Africans imprisoned abroad unequally.
However, the position of the South African government on the issue of prisoner transfer agreements appears to be changing. This change is demonstrated by the following two developments. In its 2011/2012 Annual Report the Department of Correctional Services 9 states that:
The eight pronged strategy that are [sic] utilised to down manage overcrowding is proving to be effective, while there is a need to make greater impact on the level of overcrowding. . While the interstate transfer approach is driven by the department's approach to rehabilitation and the inability of effective reintegration of foreign nationals into their home countries, such inter-state transfers will also have a positive impact on levels of overcrowding.
The above statement indicates that the Department is working hand in hand with countries in the region to put in place a multilateral prisoner transfer protocol to, reduce the level of overcrowding in South African prisons, amongst other things. In July 2012 the spokesperson for the Department of Correctional Services, Logan Maistry, 11 reportedly said:
Following a request from Cabinet, a memorandum to approve the adoption of a South African policy position on the PTA has been completed. Once a policy position has been adopted by Cabinet, the specific nature of agreements will be negotiated on a case by case basis. In conjunction with sister departments (including Justice and Home Affairs) the PTA has been initiated and (will follow) due process.
This move was welcomed by civil society. 12 Whatever the driving force behind this move by the South African government to start the process of putting in place measures to transfer offenders, one could argue that there are at least three factors that could have played a role in influencing South Africa to enter into prisoner transfer arrangements. The first factor is that a large number of foreign nationals are serving prison terms in South African prisons. Although the author has not had access to the information to determine accurately the number of foreign nationals in South African prisons, it is fair to estimate that they are in their thousands. The Minister added that "605 sentenced offenders come from Lesotho, 100 from Swaziland, 11 from Namibia and 10 from Botswana" and that there were 184
Nigerian sentenced offenders.
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The second factor is that there are a large number of South African nationals serving prison sentences in foreign countries. It is estimated that there are almost a thousand South Africans serving their sentences abroad. 16 These South Africans are imprisoned in countries such as Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Peru, most of them on drug-related charges. 17 There has been an increase in media attention on the plight of South Africans imprisoned abroad, and government has been called upon by the families of the South Africans imprisoned abroad to enter into prisoner transfer agreements with some of these countries and bring those South Africans back to South Africa to serve their sentences. 18 The third and final factor could be that South Africa has ratified two international treaties which contain provisions encouraging states parties to enter into prisoner transfer arrangements as one of the ways to effectively implement these treaties. These treaties are the United Nations Africa on the basis of these treaties.
The ratification of these two treaties would save South Africa the time and resources that would have been spent in entering into prisoner transfer arrangements with each and every state party to these treaties. This is an approach that many countries are increasingly adopting and that explains why countries are increasingly ratifying these treaties. Related to the above is the Scheme for the Transfer of Convicted Offenders within the Commonwealth (1990) . This Scheme, as the name It provides inter alia for the following: the purpose of the transfer (a 1); the conditions that have to be met by the administering country and the sentencing country before the transfer (a 4); the obligations imposed on the sentencing country (a 5); the offender's consent to the transfer and how it should be verified (a 8); the effect of the transfer for both the sentencing and the administering states (aa 10 and 11); the continued enforcement of the sentence (a 12); pardon, amnesty, commutation and review of sentence (a 13); information on enforcement (a 15) and the costs of the transfer (a 17 These rights are: (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it; (b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) to be given a public trial before an ordinary court; (d) to have the trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay; (e) to be present, when being tried; (f) to choose, and be represented by, a legal practitioner, and to be informed of this right promptly; (g) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed of this right promptly; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be compelled to give selfincriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language that the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the proceedings interpreted in that language; (I) not to be convicted for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted; (m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of an which South Africa is a party, such as those under article 14 of the International act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted; (n) to be entitled to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and (o) to be entitled to appeal to, or to a review by, a higher court. (CC) para 9 where the Constitutional Court states that the opening words of s 35(3) " [I] ndicate that such specification is not exhaustive of what the right to a fair trial comprises. It also does not warrant the conclusion that the right to a fair trial consists merely of a number of discrete sub-rights, some of which have been specified in the subsection and others not. The right to a fair trial is a comprehensive and integrated right, the content of which will be established, on a case by case basis, as our constitutional jurisprudence on s 35 (3) Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that: "(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him; (b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; (c) To be tried without undue delay; (d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it; (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court; (g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt."
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Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) provides that: "(1) Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. (2) No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender." 1. In the case of continued enforcement, the administering State 66 shall be bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing State. 2. If, however, this sentence is by its nature or duration incompatible with the law of the administering State, or its law so requires, that State may, by a court or administrative order, adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence. As to its nature, the punishment or measure shall, as far as possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced. It shall not aggravate, by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in the sentencing State, nor exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the administering State.
Article 11 provides for conversion in the following terms
In the case of conversion of sentence, the procedures provided for by the law of the administering State apply. When converting the sentence, the competent authority: (a) shall be bound by the findings as to the facts insofar as they appear explicitly or implicitly from the judgment imposed in the sentencing State; (b) may not convert a sanction involving deprivation of liberty to a pecuniary sanction; (c) shall deduct the full period of deprivation of liberty served by the sentenced person; and (d) shall not aggravate the penal position of the sentenced person, and shall not be bound by any minimum which the law of the administering State may provide for the offence or offences committed. The state that administers or enforces the sentence that has been imposed (the receiving state) by the sentencing state or the transferring state (the sending state).
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Articles 10 and 11 should be read in conjunction with a 9 of the Council of Europe's Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (1985). author's view that the relevant paragraphs of the Explanatory Report on article 10 are worth reproducing in detail:
49. Where the administering State opts for the "continued enforcement" procedure, it is bound by the legal nature as well as the duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing State (paragraph 1): the first condition ("legal nature") refers to the kind of penalty imposed where the law of the sentencing State provides for a diversity of penalties involving deprivation of liberty, such as penal servitude, imprisonment or detention. The second condition ("duration") means that the sentence to be served in the administering State, subject to any later decision of that State on, for example, conditional release or remission, corresponds to the amount of the original sentence, taking into account the time served and any remission earned in the sentencing State up to the date of transfer.
50. If the two States concerned have different penal systems with regard to the division of penalties or the minimum and maximum lengths of sentence, it might be necessary for the administering State to adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence. Paragraph 2 allows that adaptation within certain limits: the adapted punishment or measure must, as far as possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced; it must not aggravate, by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in the sentencing State; and it must not exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the administering State. In other words: the administering State may adapt the sanction to the nearest equivalent available under its own law, provided that this does not result in more severe punishment or longer detention… [T]he procedure under Article 10.2 enables the administering State merely to adapt the sanction to an equivalent sanction prescribed by its own law in order to make the sentence enforceable. The administering State thus continues to enforce the sentence imposed in the sentencing State, but it does so in accordance with the requirements of its own penal system. One needs to comment on how continued enforcement would work in South Africa.
If a South African national is, for example, convicted of premeditated murder in
Zimbabwe and the court finds that there are extenuating circumstances 68 and he is sentenced to life imprisonment, his sentence in Zimbabwe would be governed by section 344A of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act which provides that:
[s]ubject to any other law, the effect of a sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on or after the date of commencement of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Amendment Act, 1997, shall be that the person so sentenced shall remain imprisoned for the rest of his life. 51. Article 11 concerns the conversion of the sentence to be enforced, that is the judicial or administrative procedure by which a sanction prescribed by the law of the administering State is substituted for the sanction imposed in the sentencing State, a procedure which is commonly called "exequatur". The provision should be read in conjunction with Article 9.1. b. It is essential for the smooth and efficient functioning of the convention in cases where, with regard to the classification of penalties or the length of the custodial sentence applicable for similar offence, the penal system of the administering State differs from that of the sentencing State.
52. The article does not regulate the procedure to be followed. According to paragraph 1, the conversion of the sentence is governed by the law of the administering State.
The Explanatory Report 78 adds that the reason why the administering state is bound by the facts and findings of the court in the sentencing state is that:
…the substitution by a sanction of a different nature or duration does not imply any modification of the judgment; it merely serves to obtain an enforceable sentence in the administering State.
The Convention "does not prevent conversion to a non-custodial sanction other than a pecuniary one. or Russia has to accept that these countries will convert the sentence in question.
The Republic of San Marino will allow continued enforcement only in "special cases"
and if it is the administering state, but as a general rule it will convert the sentences 
Conclusion
Although for many years South Africa has been reluctant to enter into prisoner transfer agreements or arrangements, there is evidence that this position is likely to change. This article has highlighted some of the issues that the South African authorities would have to grapple with in implementing prisoner transfer agreements, in particular when they involve transferring offenders to South Africa. It is evident that the issue of human rights is critical in prisoner transfer arrangements and it is most likely to be one of the critical issues in determining either whether an offender will be transferred to South Africa or will continue to serve his sentence in 100 It has been argued by Van Zyl Smit and Spencer "European Dimension to the Release of Sentenced Prisoners" 43 that: "[w]hile the early Council of Europe instruments in particular were designed to meet humanitarian concerns for offenders who were held in countries other than their own and were thus less likely to be 'socially rehabilitated', the focus has increasingly shifted to the interests of the sentencing states. These states often want troublesome foreign offenders to be returned to their home countries, not because the offenders' interests would be better served by being returned, but because the sentencing states want to be rid of them to reduce the burden they place on overstretched resources for the implementation of sentences." It has been argued by Bassiouni "United States Policies and Practices" 588 that: "[t]he main problems facing a foreign prisoner are the cultural and language barrier, the lack of rehabilitation programmes and refusal of conditional release programmes (due to the perceived flight risk), and the general prejudice faced by the foreign prisoner, other prisoners, and prison staff. Prisoner transfer agreements were seen as a way to alleviate these additional burdens on the foreign prisoner. However, it would appear that these treaties are now also seen as a method by which the sentencing country can expel foreign prisoners and relieve itself of a considerable financial strain, which is a motive which runs contrary to the humanitarian goals of these treaties."
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For example, the agreements between the United Kingdom and Libya and Rwanda do not require the offender's consent before the transfer. See a 4(3) (Libya); a 2(3) (Rwanda). The treaty with Rwanda expressly mentions that the offender's consent will not be required for the transfer to take place.
South Africa. In the light of the fact that South Africa has a Constitution which includes a Bill of Rights and is also a party to international and regional human rights instruments, it is recommended that in any prisoner transfer agreement or arrangement the rights of offenders to be transferred to South Africa should take centre stage. For example, these treaties should provide for the rights to freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and an offender's right to challenge the transfer decision before a court of law if needs be.
It is also recommended that South Africa could adopt different approaches to regulate the transfer of offenders, which means that all of the approaches discussed above should be considered. South Africa should enact prisoner transfer legislation to enable it to transfer offenders with countries with which it does not have a prisoner transfer bilateral treaty or which are not parties to a multilateral treaty to which South Africa is party, should enter into bilateral prisoner transfer agreements or arrangements, and should also ratify or accede to multilateral prisoner transfer 
